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Abstract—The term System of Systems (SoS) is often used
to classify an arrangement of independent and interdependent
systems delivering unique capabilities. There appear to be many
examples of SoSs, but the term has become a source of confusion.
While many approaches have been proposed for engineering
SoSs, there are few illustrative examples demonstrating their
initial classification and resulting SoS structure. This paper
presents an approach for framing a candidate SoS using the
Afghan Mission Network defined as an Acknowledged SoS,
and presents issues associated with SoSs stakeholders, human
factors and interoperability considerations resulting from such
an approach.
Index Terms—System of Systems, Systems Engineering,
Afghan Mission Network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term System of Systems (SoS) is used to refer to a
collection of inter-connected systems that at times may come
together for a common purpose or goal at a SoS level, where
individual systems may also operate with a degree of auton-
omy in their own right. However, the term can also be used
inconsistently across audiences, creating ambiguity towards
how a SoS may be represented, emphasising the need for
clarity when defining and characterising a SoS. For example,
SoSs may be considered complex, adaptive, large-scale and
may also be constrained by geographical considerations, yet
it is not always clear in which context a system or systems
become complex, or indeed whether the notion of large-
scale is a direct result of geographical boundaries, or the
number of systems and inter-connections used within the SoS.
Consequently, it is easy to become confused by the use of the
term SoS, and how SoSs should be categorised and defined
for a given context, e.g. SoSs from an engineering or security
viewpoint.
In addition to specific SoS design, engineering and on-
going operational needs, individual systems in the SoS usually
retain their own identities along with their own authorities,
responsibilities, and resources to support current and evolving
user needs [1]. However, with evolving systems and collabo-
rations, a more diverse approach is required when designing,
developing and maintaining larger scaled systems or SoS. A
single system approach may overlook certain aspects, such
as all stakeholder needs, security, interoperability, or vital
situational awareness supporting resilience; this may lead to
increased levels of un-assessed risk.
While there is some diversity in the approaches proposed for
engineering SoSs, a gap is evident towards a formal process for
defining and characterising a SoS, with few examples illustrat-
ing their SoS outputs. It would, therefore, be useful to identify
a candidate SoS, and illustrate how this candidate might be
framed as a SoS given its characteristics, enabling a platform
for applying suitable design techniques to SoS components
appropriate to SoS type and complexity, considering where
issues may exist if the management and participation spans
multiple SoSs. Such an example could be modelled, to not
only illustrate the coming together of systems forming a SoS,
but to start reaping the benefits that its framing as a SoS should
allow.
To address this gap, we present a process for eliciting,
modelling and characterising the Afghan Mission Network
(AMN) as a SoS. We consider the existing work and elicitation
processes for SoSs in Section II before presenting an approach
for framing a candidate SoS in Section III, using the AMN
and its SoS characteristics in Section III-A to walk through
a process where this is framed as an Acknowledged SoS
in Section III-B. We conclude by discussing some of the
implications of our approach in Section IV, and presenting
some directions for future work in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. SoS Examples
Before considering how SoSs may be defined, it is useful
to consider examples of SoSs. A pervasive example is the
smartphone, which is made up of a number of various func-
tional components while externally providing data connections
traversing global networks. These networks could themselves
be viewed as a SoSs. Software applications on the smartphone
may be operated by users to connect to and control other smart
systems such as home security, communications systems, or
assistive technology [2]. The smartphone therefore goes be-
yond providing basic capabilities of voice and text-based data
transmissions, and as with other smart devices, may at times
become a business or personal central Command & Control
device. This demonstrates how an inter-connected reliance and
coming together of systems to achieve collaborative objectives
may be considered within examples of a SoS. Other SoSs
include general business information systems, sensor networks
[1], and emergency response units [3] that bring together
independently owned and managed systems and services such
as fire, police, ambulance, and other facilities collaborating to
deliver a service on which reliance is placed to achieve the
SoS level objective or mission [4].
These examples illustrate where confusion may exist when
defining and classifying inter-connected systems as being a
SoS. On one end of the scale a hand-held device may be
considered a SoS, however, military and defence systems may
also be perceived as being a SoS, but on a much larger scale
with quite different characteristics. When considering these
characteristics across different examples, a distinction can be
made as to the likely level of complexity and governance
involved in the management and operations of the systems
inter-connecting into the SoS to achieve its goal and purpose,
which can better assist in categorising and defining SoSs.
B. Systems and SoS
A distinction should be drawn when understanding what
constitutes a System in comparison to a SoS and its related
boundaries. For example, a system could be defined as being
a functionally, physically, and/or behaviourally related group
of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group
of elements forming a unified whole [5]. INCOSE [6] suggest
a system is a combination of interacting elements organized
to achieve one or more stated purposes, whereas a SoS
applies to a System-of-Interest (SOI) whose system elements
are themselves systems. Typically these are large scale inter-
disciplinary problems with multiple heterogeneous distributed
systems [6]. Boardman and Sauser [7] believe the difference
between a system and SoS lies in its composition, and is based
on how the parts and relationships are gathered together and
therefore in the nature of the emergent whole.
Maier [8] argues the inter-connected systems are formed
of substantially independently and operated elements. These
elements do not solely contribute to an overall purpose or
set of functions, but rather individually fulfil useful purposes.
Therefore, in order to be classified as being a SoS, the system
should correspond with the following parameters [8]:
• The elements of the system are themselves sufficiently
complex to be considered systems;
• Operating together, the elements produce functions and
fulfil purposes not produced or fulfilled by the elements
alone;
• Each element possess operational independence and ful-
fils useful purposes whether or not connected to the
assemblage. If disconnected, the element continues to
fulfil useful purposes;
• Each element possess managerial independence, and
managed, at least in part, for its own purposes rather than
the purposes of the collective;
• A SoS is typically geographically distributed such that its
elements exchange only information rather than mass or
energy;
• A SoS typically evolves over time and space. It does
not have a unique configuration, but rather evolves and
changes.
Maier further defines SoSs by certain combinations related
to managerial and operational independence. These are defined
as being Directed, Collaborative and Virtual [9]. However,
Sommerville [10] claims these classifications fail to reflect
the distinctions between different types of SoSs. For example,
when considering systems as Virtual this is confusing given the
term is also used to describe something that is usually imple-
mented by software, e.g. virtual machines [10]. Additionally,
Dahmann and Baldwin [11] introduce a fourth definition of an
Acknowledged SoS, which can be specifically identified within
certain Department of Defense (DoD) activities. These have
capability objectives, management, and resources to support
the SoS, are comprised of existing systems along with new
developments, and posses qualities of Collaborative and to a
degree Directed SoSs.
To help distinguish Acknowledged SoSs, we highlight four
main categories of SoSs. While SoSs generally fall into one of
these categories, the distinction is not always clean. In some
scenarios, a system may also be considered to be a different
type of SoS within its own operational environment. In other
scenarios, a Collaborative SoS may need to formulate into
an Acknowledged SoS due to the importance of the missions
supported by the SoS, or the complexities of the cross-cutting
SoS capabilities [12].
Directed SoSs: Are built and managed to fulfil specific pur-
poses; they are centrally managed during long-term operation
to continue to fulfil and evolve those purposes. Component
systems maintain an ability to operate independently, but
their normal operational mode is subordinated to the central
managed purpose [9].
Acknowledged SoSs: Have recognised objectives, a desig-
nated manager, and resources for the SoS, but constituent sys-
tems retain their independent ownership, objectives, funding,
as well as development and sustainment approaches. Changes
to systems are based on collaboration between the SoS and
systems [11].
Collaborative SoSs: Are distinct from Directed SoSs in that
the central management organisation does not have coercive
power to run the system. The component systems must, more
or less, voluntarily collaborate to fulfil the agreed upon central
purposes [9].
Virtual SoSs: Lack both a central management authority
and centrally agreed upon purposes, may exist deliberately or
accidentally, and large-scale behaviour emerges, which may be
desirable [9]. Participants informally collaborate and manage
their own systems to maintain the system as a whole [10].
C. SoSs Stakeholders
Given the distinct differences and challenges between inter-
connections of the SoS, when eliciting and modelling a SoS
it is imperative to consider all stakeholders as well as its
inter-connections towards identifying the boundaries of the
SoS. For example, the ownership and operation of constituent
systems within a SoS by independent stakeholders may lead to
limitations on the exchange of information [4]. Stakeholders
may not always be recognised across the SoS, or stakeholders
of individual systems may have little interest, or resist the SoS
demands on their system giving lower priority to the SoS [5].
Examples of stakeholders would be considered throughout
the System life-cycle stages of engineering, development,
transfer for production or use, logistics and maintenance,
operation, and disposal [13]. SoS projects may engage a
diverse group of stakeholders, however all stakeholders should
be valued and recognised as being unique individuals assisting
in the discovery of socio-technical and psychological factors
relevant to project requirements [14].
III. APPROACH AND CASE STUDY
Despite various engineering guides [5] [6], or systems
engineering approaches [15], [16], [17], there appears to be
no commonly used formal framework for classifying and
modelling a candidate SoS; only commonly used descriptions
have been posited. To address this challenge, we propose
aligning the SoS definition and characteristics noted in Section
II, and consider the differences between a system and a SoS
[7], along with Maier’s parameters [8] to determine if it is a
SoS. If it is, it can then be defined by the characteristics from
one of the four SoS types.
Based on our approach, which is grounded in a review of
its related literature, and interviews with its stakeholders, we
propose the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) as a working
example of an Acknowledged SoS. This is supported by
findings demonstrating the combined systems interaction of
the AMN, using the sub-categories described by Dahmann and
Baldwin [16] to frame the AMN as an Acknowledged SoS.
The AMN was formed out of necessity from a previous SoS
supporting Afghan operations, which could be viewed as a
Collaborative SoS, incorporating Directed SoSs representing
each of the partners and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs).
A. Considering the AMN as a SoS
The AMN was a meshing of the communication links and
data feeds used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) during
the Afghanistan campaign missions [18]. Prior to the creation
of the AMN, each TCN communicated across on its own non-
federated network, operating without a common core making
information sharing a challenge [19]. To improve this, a shift
in cultural mind-set was required from a ‘Need to Know’ to a
‘Share to Win’ approach, specifically as ISAF recognised data
restriction created greater risks [20], although this approach
was complicated by national concerns and restrictions on data
sharing [21]. It was also found the technical problems of net-
centric warfare were relatively minor compared to cultural
issues and human factors, particularly as personnel interacting
with intelligence information could no longer be considered as
secondary actors [18]. Robust information management was
therefore required to meet the needs of people, process and
technology, and timely decision making within the AMN [20].
By placing all information exchange on the common ISAF
Secret network, during 2010, the AMN become the primary
communications network for ISAF forces [20], extending
across Afghanistan to 48 TCNs servicing a total force of
over 130,000 combined military and civilian personnel with
human-to-human exchanges of basic services for text-based
chat, audio-based Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) tele-
phone connectivity, video-based Secure Video Teleconferenc-
ing (SVTC), email, web access, and office productivity tools
[22]. The AMN provided Command & Control (C2) to support
growing mission and coalition partners needs, and evolved into
the primary Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) [22].
This supported rapid decision making within the AMN by
using coalition data and Common Operational Pictures (COPs)
[22] to improve Situational Awareness (SA) of the security
environments [23].
B. Framing the AMN as an Acknowledged SoS
A review of the AMN identified dominant systems and
stakeholders with designated management and oversight inter-
connecting in a collaborative nature, reliant upon the core
of the AMN collaboration between NATO/ISAF and TCNs.
Representative systems responsible for the acquisition, im-
plementation and operations, testing & validation, in-theatre
users, and other external entities can be identified, although all
systems have overlapping boundaries with differing priorities
and dependencies, presenting a strong indication the AMN
would be classed as an Acknowledged SoS.
AMN Management and Oversight
Stakeholder Involvement: In Acknowledged SoS, stakehold-
ers are at both System level and SoS levels, and includes
the system owners, with competing interests and priorities. In
some cases, the system stakeholder has no vested interest in
the SoS and all stakeholders may not be recognized [11].
For the success of the AMN, considering stakeholder needs
was an important challenge to ensure a continuous operation
of local, military and civilian interaction priorities were met.
Primary stakeholders included NATO/ISAF, TCNs and part-
ners. The list of direct and in-direct stakeholders was extensive
across all SoS and System levels, although stakeholders at
system level would have a vested interest in the SoS given
the nature of their participation. Other important in-direct
stakeholders reliant upon the information flow of the AMN
included NATO’s civilian representation, the Afghanistan gov-
ernment, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO’s), other international or-
ganisations supporting humanitarian or aid efforts [24], and
the Afghan population working to implement mutual goals
for their nation.
Governance: In Acknowledged SoS, there are added levels
of complexity due to management and funding for both the
SoS and individual systems, meaning the SoS does not have
authority over all the systems [11].
Governance within the AMN was achieved at a number
of levels, e.g. NATO/ISAF AMN Operations, testing and
validation collectives, and other national level input. Therefore,
added levels of complexity arise across all levels of the SoS
Governance. Funding was focused at the SoS level, whereas
individual systems connecting to and forming the AMN were
funded, managed and operated by relevant participating na-
tions, thus retaining a level of autonomy.
AMN Operational Environment
Operational Focus: In Acknowledged SoS, they are called
upon to meet a set of operational objectives using systems
whose objectives may or may not align with the SoS objectives
[11].
The NATO Communication and Information Systems Ser-
vices Agency (NCSA) and its Mission Detachment to ISAF
(NMD-I) were responsible for the operation of in-theatre Com-
munication and Information Systems (CIS) services. Meeting
the needs of operational objectives and mission threads were,
therefore, aligned with the SoS objectives. However, TCNs
and other agencies were likely to have national objectives
separate or in addition to SoS objectives. Within the AMN, the
Joint Mission Threads (JMTs) such as Battlespace Awareness,
Medical Evacuation, and Freedom of Movement, together
with applicable services critical to their functioning were the
primary means of aligning the goals and activities of the SoS
to achieve its mission [22], thus being integral systems within
the SoS.
AMN Implementation
Acquisition: In Acknowledged SoS, added complexity exists
due to multiple system life-cycles across acquisition programs,
involving legacy systems, developmental systems, new devel-
opments, and technology insertion, which typically have stated
capability objectives up front that may need to be translated
into formal requirements [11].
The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
(NC3A) primary role was to develop, acquire and implement
capabilities using their expertise of C2 through to C5ISR,
providing vital communications and data services supporting
NATO forces across Afghanistan [25]. To meet the operational
needs of the NMD-I, Thales were tasked by the AMN Ar-
chitecture Working Group (AMN AWG) with the provision,
operation and maintenance of a complete network, end-to-end
logistics and integration of systems, including transfer of all
equipment throughout the theatre of operations in Afghanistan
[26]. However, participants at a system level were responsible
for ensuring their legacy systems could interface with the
AMN. Complexity existed across the multiple system life-
cycles, but were reduced using tried and tested solutions,
supported by testing and validation programmes providing
feedback for improvements to core technology, systems and
configurations within the SoS.
Test & Evaluation: In Acknowledged SoS, testing is more
challenging due to the difficulty of synchronizing across multi-
ple systems life-cycles, given the complexity of all the moving
parts and potential for unintended consequences [11].
The Coalition Interoperability Assurance and Validation
(CIAV) programme provided in-theatre mission-based assur-
ance testing & validation, and verified the status of interoper-
ability among current, future, and experimental systems that
would be deployed within the AMN [22]. The CIAV Work-
ing Group (CIAV WG) were responsible for interoperability
improvements within AMN governance structure, and inte-
grated with accreditation groups providing security of coalition
information and networks established under the Combined
Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet) [27]. The
CFBLNet facilitated development of coalition interoperability,
doctrine, procedures, and protocols that could be transitioned
to operational networks in future coalition operations, car-
ried out through 17 dedicated integrated labs based in ten
nations [28], and bi-annual testing with the Coalition Test
and Evaluation Environment (CTE2) and Coalition Warrior
Interoperability Exercise (CWIX) [29] for new systems and
architecture of specified CIAV assessments [30].
AMN Engineering and Design Considerations
Boundaries and Interfaces: In Acknowledged SoS, the focus
is on identifying the systems that contribute to the SoS objec-
tives and enabling the flow of data, control, and functionality
across the SoS while balancing needs of the systems [11].
The AMN AWG developed the architecture and modelling
of the AMN mission threads to support multi-national C5ISR
planning at the enterprise level [31]. SoS boundaries and
interfacing requirements were identified through the NC3A,
Thales, AMN AWG, and implemented by the NMD-I over a
single core network at the classification level of ISAF Secret.
The AMN boundary generally ends with the connections to
each of the TCNs, although some data distributed through the
AMN may be disseminated through national level command
structures, under national policy and control. Boundaries are
also considered in different contexts, covering networks, peo-
ple, process, and technology, across land, sea, air, space and
cyber domains, where different parameters, characteristics and
interfacing requirements exist.
Performance & Behaviour: In Acknowledged SoS, perfor-
mance is across the SoS that satisfies SoS user capability needs
while balancing needs of the systems [11].
NMD-I and Thales managed and monitored on-going per-
formance of objectives to meet the SoS objectives of secure
C5ISR data flow, with further performance and interoperabil-
ity feedback provided by TCNs and the CIAV programme.
Direction, oversight and monitoring of security behaviour
for Cyber Defence was conducted by the NATO Cyber De-
fence Management Authority (NCDMA), whilst the NATO
Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) provided
capabilities for maintaining the end-to-end network security.
Security risks faced by the AMN often emanated from tar-
geted network attacks using malicious software and Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks, spam, malware, web defacements,
or poor maintenance related vulnerabilities, system privilege
abuse, authorised user indiscretions, and classified information
leakage [32].
IV. DISCUSSION
In the context of a mission-driven Acknowledged SoS,
each direct stakeholder had a vested interest towards the
AMN achieving its SoS mission objective, with differing
input either at a SoS, System or Component level, although
some stakeholders also become users reliant upon the SoS
or in-direct benefactors of its output. Stakeholders should,
therefore, be viewed as multi-dimensional and their interaction
at differing levels should be understood, with a focus towards
understanding a system’s stakeholder objectives towards the
SoS and the role it plays at each stage of achieving the
SoS mission, including bi-directional dependencies on people,
processes and technology for implementation and operation of
systems participating with the AMN or similar Acknowledged
SoS.
To support set-up of operations in future SoSs environments,
with applicable stakeholders providing differing inputs and
outputs at varying stages of the systems and development life-
cycles, joining options should be more straight-forward with
proven solutions for integration. Common service management
and cost-effective cross provisioning of services incorporat-
ing data labelling for easier information sharing should be
considered [33], which can have a positive effect towards
interoperability.
The AMN as a SoS supports the agile ‘Come as you are’
approach where future mission networks must interoperate
with differing mission types and partners, with the need to
communicate information at specified security classification
levels [34]. There is, however, a duty of the system entities
within the SoS to identify a unified approach that answers
the question ‘How should we come?’ This reinforces the
need for global standardisation of data types, system and
network configurations to improve interoperability. This need
will become more prevalent in Acknowledged, Collaborative
and Virtual SoS as central management or control is reduced.
Commonly defined and understood mission threads should
be used to guide the development of future coalition data-
sharing enterprises, and be supported with assurance & valida-
tion through programmes such as CIAV and the CFBLnet [22],
who could both be viewed as individual SoSs. Testing was an
iterative process that should focus on the end-state and mission
thread success requirements, considering that components are
put into systems, systems are put into platforms, platforms
must interoperate with other families of platforms, and these
family of platforms must interoperate via networks [31]. This
demonstrates the consideration towards a need for components
and systems to scale-up to interoperate with higher groupings
of systems to achieve its purpose as a SoS.
To achieve a standardised, consistent and interoperable ap-
proach in a single, common mission-centric federated network
such as the AMN, requirements may include the use of
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware and software, as
opposed to developing expensive in-house alternatives, while
maximising the use of other current applications, interfaces,
web services [32], reducing costs and resources. Further
consideration should also be given towards dependencies from
the use of COTS products and risks created within the supply
chain relating to product availability, or ensuring security and
reliability of products before use and implementation in SoS.
Human Factor interoperability considerations were another
challenge faced by the AMN, particularly when considering
end-users in-theatre were dependent upon systems that were
easy to administer and operate, and possessed the ability
to provide reliable and timely CIS and SA in emergency
scenarios [35]. Related work in emergency services found that
a key characteristic of an SoS is its inherent socio-technical
nature, where social factors can become even more complex
than technical interoperability [3].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an approach for framing a candi-
date SoS as an Acknowledged SoS using the AMN. Applying
this process assisted in defining and characterising a SoS,
enabling a platform for applying suitable design techniques
to SoS components appropriate to SoS type and complexity.
By considering the structure, management, and participation of
systems and stakeholders within the SoS, this helped identify
where dependencies and constraints may exist towards the SoS
achieving its SoS mission objectives.
Findings suggest considerations for SoSs and future mission
networks should include a specific focus towards identifying
all relevant SoS stakeholders and individual mission-driven
needs, including relevant human factor implementation and
operational considerations. Cultural, environmental and geo-
graphical considerations were of key importance in the AMN,
with a high dependence on the cyber domain, creating a greater
dependency on interoperability for availability of systems and
networks. Information and data sharing needs should be agreed
and utilise common data labelling and classification formats
using appropriate information management, security, and risk
approaches. Moreover, to support timely integration when
forming a robust SoS, this may incorporate COTS hardware
and software over in-house development, using tried, tested
and supported solutions that operate in a standardised manner
and consider human factors and interoperability as a standard
requirement.
We believe our work makes a contribution towards current
research challenges relating to SoSs and supports future work
considering other examples of SoS types to clearly differenti-
ate between characteristics and their challenges. Future work
will continue build upon a case-study approach to apply the
characteristics of a given SoS leading to analysis from an
operational, security or engineering view of security and risk
assessment in SoSs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The research described in this paper was
funded by Bournemouth University studentship
DSTLX1000104780R BOURNEMOUTH PhD RASOS.
We are also grateful to DSTL for their sponsorship of this
work.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Baldwin, J. Dahmann, and J. Goodnight, “Systems of Systems and
Security: A Defense Perspective,” Insight, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 11–14,
2011.
[2] P. Whittington and H. Dogan, “Smartpowerchair: Characterization and
usability of a pervasive system of systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Human-Machine Systems, 2016.
[3] H. Dogan, S. A. Pilfold, and M. Henshaw, “The role of Human Factors
in addressing Systems of Systems complexity,” in Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics (SMC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE,
2011, pp. 1244–1249.
[4] C. B. Nielsen, P. G. Larsen, J. Fitzgerald, J. Woodcock, and J. Peleska,
“Systems of Systems Engineering: Basic Concepts, Model-Based Tech-
niques, and Research Directions,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 48, no. 2,
pp. 18:1–18:41, Sep. 2015.
[5] Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology. Systems and Software Engineering, Systems and Software
Engineering. Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems, 1st ed.,
Washington, DC: ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008, 2008.
[6] International Council of Systems Engineering (INCOSE), Systems En-
gineering Handbook, version 3.1 ed., INCOSE, Aug. 2007.
[7] J. Boardman and B. Sauser, “System of systems-the meaning of of,”
in 2006 IEEE/SMC International Conference on System of Systems
Engineering. IEEE, 2006, p. 6.
[8] M. W. Maier, “Research challenges for Systems-of-Systems,” in 2005
IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, vol. 4.
IEEE, 2005, pp. 3149–3154.
[9] M. W. Maier, “Architecting principles for systems-of-systems,” in IN-
COSE International Symposium, vol. 6, no. 1. Wiley Online Library,
1996, pp. 565–573.
[10] I. Sommerville, Software Engineering, 10th ed. Pearson, 2015.
[11] J. S. Dahmann and K. J. Baldwin, “Understanding the current state
of US defense systems of systems and the implications for systems
engineering,” in Systems Conference, 2008 2nd Annual IEEE. IEEE,
2008, pp. 1–7.
[12] J. A. Lane and D. Epstein, “What is a System of Systems and why should
I care?” University of Southern California, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://csse.usc.edu/TECHRPTS/2013/reports/usc-csse-2013-500.pdf
[13] SEBoK Authors, The Guide to the Systems Engineering Body of Knowl-
edge (SEBoK), 1st ed. Hoboken, NJ: The Trustees of the Stevens
Institute of Technology.: BKCASE, 2016, ch. Stakeholder Needs and
Requirements.
[14] J. Cleland-Huang, “Stakeholders on the prowl,” IEEE Software, vol. 33,
no. 2, pp. 29–31, 2016.
[15] J. O. Clark, “System of Systems Engineering from a Standards V-Model
and from a Standards, V-Model, and Dual V-Model Perspective,” in
Systems and Software Technology Conference, Apr. 2009.
[16] J. S. Dahmann, G. Rebovich Jr, and J. A. Lane, “Systems Engineering
for Capabilities,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2008.
[17] J. Dahmann, G. Rebovich, M. McEvilley, and G. Turner, “Security En-
gineering in a System of Systems environment,” in Systems Conference
(SysCon), 2013 IEEE International. IEEE, 2013, pp. 364–369.
[18] W. Finn, “Afghan Mission Network: The Human Factor,” http://amrel.
com/2011/02/02/afghan-mission-network-the-human-factor/, Feb 2011.
[19] P. Buxbaum, “Network for a Mission,” Military Information Technology,
vol. 14, no. 9, Oct. 2010.
[20] J. Nankervis, “Afghan Mission Network,” in Command and Control In
Network Enabled Capabilities Environment: Seminar Review Document.
NATO / National Defence University, 2011, pp. 24–25.
[21] G. I. Seffers, “Combat communicators bust paradigms,” SIGNAL
Magazine, AFCEA International, Jan. 2011. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.afcea.org/content/?q=combat-communicators-bust-paradigms
[22] C. C. Serena, I. R. Porche III, J. B. Predd, J. Osburg, and B. Lossing,
“Lessons Learned from the Afghan Mission Network: Developing a
Coalition Contingency Network,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2014.
[23] R. D. Thiele, “Enabling Cooperation via Common Situational Awareness
Pragmatic Considerations on NATO-China Cooperation,” Institut fr
Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW, Tech.
Rep. 220, Mar. 2013.
[24] L. Brooke-Holland and C. Mills, “Afghanistan: The Timetable for
Security Transition,” House of Commons Library, International Affairs
and Defence Section, techreport Commons Briefing papers SN05851,
Jul. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/
ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05851
[25] H. S. Kenyon, “NATO Focuses on the Bottom Line to
Support Warfighters,” SIGNAL Magazine, AFCEA International,
Sep. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=
nato-focuses-bottom-line-support-warfighters
[26] Thales, “Thales and NATO strengthen partnership,” Jun.
2008. [Online]. Available: {https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/content/
thales-and-nato-strengthen-partnership}
[27] CFBLNet, “CFBLNet Publication 1 Annex A, CFBLNet Terms
of Reference,” Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network
(CFBLNet), Tech. Rep. v8, Jul. 2015. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.disa.mil/CFBLNet/Docs
[28] NATO Communications and Information Agency, “CFBLNet,” NCI
Agency Website, Nov. 2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.ncia.nato.
int/Documents/Agency%20publications/CFBLNet.pdf
[29] Anonymous, “Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX),”
NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence (C2COE) C2pedia
Website, Apr. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.c2coe.org/c2pedia/
index.php?title=Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX)
[30] J. Rose, “Coalition Inoperability Assurance and Validation Charter,”
Coalition Interoperability Assurance & Validation (CIAV), Document
Version 1.02, Dec. 2011. [Online]. Available: https://wss.apan.org/2525/
CIAV/CIAV%20Charter%20v1.02.pdf
[31] T. Rissinger, “13058 - Coalition Interoperability Assurance & Validation
(CIAV) and Coalition Test & Evaluation Environment (CTE2)-A Model
for Coalition Interoperability in a Distributed Construct,” in Track
6 - Mission 3, Effective Test and Evaluation, NDIA 14th Annual
Systems Engineering Conference. San Diego, CA, USA: NDIA,
Oct. 2011. [Online]. Available: www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011system/13058
RissingerWednesday.pptx
[32] K. Herrmann, “Assured and Secure End-to-End CIS Services
Provision in Network-Enabled Environment,” in TechNet International
2010: Session II. AFCEA, Oct. 2010. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.afcea.org/europe/events/tni/10/documents/LtGenHerrmann.pdf
[33] G. Friedrich, “From Afghanistan Mission Network to
Federated Mission Networking,” in NATO C4ISR Industry
Conference & TechNet International 2014: Session 2 New
Generation C2 Services. AFCEA Europe, NCI Agency, Mar.
2014. [Online]. Available: https://www.eiseverywhere.com/file uploads/
2f6043f27e1576122f1b3e0319d5b1d8 FromAMNtoFMN-Friedrich.pdf
[34] S. Whitehead, “Achieving Joint Force 2020 Through
Coalition Information Sharing,” Association for En-
terprise Information (Website), 2014. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.afei.org/PE/4A05/Documents/Whitehead 4A05%20%
20AFEI%20Draft%205%20Mar%2014%20(Smooth)1630.pdf
[35] K. F. Veit, “The Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) A
model for network enabled capabilities,” in Berlin Security
Conference: Panel VIII - C4ISR in NATO and EU - Command
and Control in Operations, Nov. 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://www.european-defence.com/Review/2011/binarywriterservlet?
imgUid=a3740d83-f8c1-b331-76b8-d77407b988f2&uBasVariant=
11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111
